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MIRACLES AND THE SHROUD OF TURIN
Stephen Griffith

Using the scientific investigation of the Shroud of Turin as an extended example, it is argued that miracles are best understood not as violations of natural
law, but as scientifically inexplicable events. It is then argued that even
though we can imagine circumstances in which science itself might provide
us with good grounds for believing that an event is scientifically inexplicable,
these grounds would at best provide us with circumstantial evidence that the
event was miraculous, and would in any case be inconclusive.

For several centuries, philosophical discourse concerning miracles has
largely consisted of trying to determine whether the concept of a miracle
could be defined in such a way that miracles could be 0) logically possible, (2) consistent with the predominant secular (scientific) worldview,
and (3) known to occur. Putting it this way puts the very idea of the
miraculous on the defensive, since we presuppose the secular world view
and then ask whether this worldview leaves any room for miracles. I
suggest that we consider the possibility of presupposing a theistic
worldview which includes at least the possibility of miracles and then
ask what implications this has for science. For the purpose of this paper,
I shall simply assume that such a theistic worldview can be shown to be
inherently rational, and that there are no sound a priori arguments
against the possibility of miracles. After sketching roughly what a theistic account of miracles might look like, I shall discuss whether scientific
investigation can provide us with evidence for or against the occurrence
of miracles, using the image on the infamous Shroud of Turin as an
extended example.
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to describe or
defend a theistic world view to any great extent. For our present purposes it will suffice to note that according to any standard interpretation of
the theistic world view, God is both the creator and sustainer of the
physical universe. If we then suppose that there are "ultimate constituents" of the universe, i.e., entities of which it is ultimately composed, whether they be atoms, intelligences, monads, leptons, or
"strings", it follows that God is the creator and sustainer of these constituents. If we further suppose that these entities, which I shall henceforth refer to as "theons", have certain inherent properties, some of
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which are causal powers which determine how these theons interact, it
seems reasonable to suppose that God must continually supply theons
with whatever properties they have. 1 In other words, at any given
moment, the physical world consists of entities which are at that
moment being sustained by God, and these entities have properties
which are at that moment being supplied by God.
Since we observe regularities in the physical world, regularities which
have been discovered and described in increasingly precise mathematical detail by modern science, it follows as a matter of empirical fact that
if the world does in fact consist of theons, both the existence and the
nature of most theons must be fairly stable. Within the context of the
theistic model of creation sketched above, what this amounts to is that,
for the most part, God continuously sustains the same set of theons and
continuously supplies them with the same sets of properties. From this
theistic point of view, it is only because God acts in this way that science
as we know it is even possible. If God frequently and randomly created
new theons or failed to sustain existing ones, or changed their inherent
properties, it is difficult to see how human beings could even function or
survive, much less engage in the process of formulating and testing general hypotheses concerning the nature of the physical universe, activities
which are central to and at least partly definitive of the modern scientific
enterprise. The existence of the above-mentioned regularities, often
referred to as the laws of nature, is thus not only consistent with, but can
also be explained in terms of, a theistic world view, in that it can simply
be regarded as resulting from the continuous typical action of God in
creating and sustaining the universe. Why, then, should there be any
tension between theism and the scientific worldview concerning the
possibility of miracles?
The source of tension here is twofold. In the first place, philosophers
have persisted in thinking of the laws of nature as absolutely exceptionless universal generalizations. In the second place, despite the lack of
any scriptural or theological justification for doing so, philosophers have
persisted in thinking of miracles as "violations" of the laws of nature,
where the term "violation" is understood in such a way as to make it
logically impossible for miracles to occur in a world entirely governed
by such laws. Thinking of the laws of nature and of miracles in these
ways has in turn made it seem to many philosophers that if there are
true laws of nature, there must be no miracles, and vice-versa.
As the scientific enterprise and our understanding of it evolve, however, it becomes increasingly unclear whether there really are any
Humean laws of nature, or if there are, whether they can play the central
role they were once thought to play in our understanding of the physical
world.' It thus becomes correspondingly clear that it is at best inappropriate if not perverse to continue to define miracles as violations of natural law in this sense. To the extent that we understand scientific laws
in the non-Humean way that scientists themselves typically do, we can
readily imagine the occurrence of physical events which are "violations"
of such laws, which clearly leaves open the possibility of miracles, even
if we restrict our attention to those miracles which are exceptions to the
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commonly perceived regularities in nature.;
But even if we remove the particular source of tension mentioned
above, it does not follow that there is no tension between scientific and
theistic worldviews concerning the possibility of miracles. On the contrary, this tension reappears in the form of a question as to whether
there are (or could be) scientifically inexplicable events. Those committed to a scientific worldview are wont to think that all events in the
physical world must be scientifically explicable, at least in principle,
whereas at least some of those who subscribe to a theistic world view are
wont to think that at least some purported miracles are miraculous at
least partly because they are scientifically inexplicable.
The nature and significance of scientific explanation is philosophically problematic, and it would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss it in any detail. It is noteworthy, however, that most theories of scientific explanation incorporate in one way or another the idea that individual events in the physical world are to be explained by subsuming
their descriptions under general laws, whether these laws are deterministic or indeterministic, statistical or non-statistical. Within the context
of the version of theism sketched above, however, these general laws are
to be explained entirely in terms of the fact that God seldom creates, fails
to sustain, or changes the causal powers of His theons. Thus, to explain
an event scientifically is in effect simply to show that it is ultimately the
result of God's typical behavior as creator and sustainer of the universe.
There is no reason, scientific or otherwise, to believe that God always
behaves in this statistically typical manner, much less that He must do
so. Miracles, within this framework, can be understood simply as events
which occur when and because God, sometime after the First Instant, if
there was one, creates, fails to sustain, or changes the inherent properties
of one or more theons, which He might do in answer to a prayer, to provide the faithful with a sign, or for various other reasons. To say that
miracles are impossible, within this context, would be to say that God
(after the First Instant, if there was one) can neither create new theons,
refrain from sustaining existing ones, nor change their inherent properties, but what reason could anyone have for saying any of these things?
Neither science nor common sense tell us that these things cannot happen. The most they can tell us is that we have no reason to believe that
they happen frequently, but this is not only consistent with theism, but
also tends to support it to the extent that a high degree of orderliness in
the universe has often been thought to suggest divine creation.
Moreover, there does not seem to be any theological or scriptural reason
for objecting to the account sketched above.
Assuming that we are willing to take the above account of miracles
seriously, it would be difficult if not impossible to show that miracles
were impossible, but could we ever have good reason to believe that a
miracle had occurred? It follows from the account of miracles suggested
above that miracles, if they occur, will not necessarily be subsumable
under natural law', since, by hypothesis, natural laws are simply regularities based on the typical continuous action of God in the world, and
miracles are, by hypothesis, exceptions to this continuous action. Thus,
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to the extent that scientific explanation depends upon our ability to subsume events under these natural laws, it follows that miracles will typically be scientifically inexplicable. If, then, we have good reason to
believe that some particular event is scientifically inexplicable in the relevant sense, we also have at least some reason to believe that the event
in question is miraculous, but there are several important qualifications
which must be made at this point.
To say that something is "scientifically inexplicable" is presumably to
say simply that it cannot be explained by science, but there are several
different senses in which science might be incapable of explaining something. There is a fairly weak sense in which a wide variety of physical
phenomena are scientifically inexplicable. In some cases, we lack sufficient data or, at the opposite extreme, our data is so extensive that it is
technologically unmanageable. No scientist, for example, could predict
the exact path taken by a feather dropped from the top of a tall building
on a breezy day, nor could the same scientist explain this path in detail
after the fact. In other cases, we are unable to offer a definitive scientific
explanation of a phenomenon simply because there are too many possible explanations for it, each of which is consistent both with all of the
available data and with currently accepted scientific theory. There are
so many technologically feasible methods of glazing pottery, for example, that it is often technologically impossible to determine which
method was used on some particular sample of ancient pottery. At the
same time, no one regards either the path taken by the feather or the
glazing as scientifically inexplicable in any meaningful sense. The reason
for this is that in both cases we are confident that the phenomena in
question are in principle scientifically explicable, even if they are not so in
fact. In the case of the feather, we are confident that its downward path
can in principle be explained in terms of the shape and weight of the
feather, the motions of the air surrounding the feather, and the various
laws of motion applicable in this case. In the case of the glazing, we are
confident that if we had more data, such as how many times the pottery
was heated and to what temperature, and in what order, we would be
able to choose the correct explanation from our list of possibilities. In
both of these cases, and in all cases in which phenomena are scientifically inexplicable in the weak sense currently under consideration, our confidence that these phenomena are scientifically explicable in principle is
based on the fact that they give us no reason to believe that we must add
to or change any of our currently accepted scientific principles in order
to explain them.
Let us suppose, however, that we encounter certain phenomena that
are not so easily dealt with. Suppose, in particular, that we have collected
data that would ordinarily be regarded as more than sufficient to explain
some particular phenomenon within the context of currently accepted
scientific theory, but are nevertheless unable to explain it. Suppose that
we have no reason to believe that additional data would be helpful.
Better yet, suppose that the data which we already have seems to rule out
any conceivable explanation of the phenomenon in question in terms of
currently accepted scientific theory. It will simply not do to say that phe-
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nomena of this sort cannot or do not occur. Scientists can and do deal
with such phenomena, and would make no progress without doing so,
since it is precisely phenomena of this sort, when authenticated and
repeatable, which force scientists to re-examine and revise their theories. 5
Once the theories are revised, of course, the phenomena in question are
no longer inexplicable, which is precisely the point of the revisions. But
what if a particular phenomenon is thoroughly authenticated but not
repeatable? Suppose, for example, that a man calling himself Jesus began
to walk on water, and we could scientifically authenticate that He was in
fact doing so? Would we then revise our scientific theories to accommodate this event, or would we simply regard this event as scientifically
inexplicable? It would seem that any phenomenon fitting this description would be scientifically inexplicable in a much stronger sense than
that described above. It would also fit the theistic definition of miracles
sketched above, because the very fact that it was scientifically inexplicable strongly suggests that at least some of the theons participating in the
event in question have causal powers other than those they normally
have. It would thus appear that in a case like that described above, science might not only be consistent with theism, but actually provide evidence that a miraculous event had occurred. It could, for example, provide quite ordinary and acceptable scientific evidence that the substance
being walked upon is ordinary water (assuming that God has not
changed the theons which compose the water), and that the man called
Jesus has a body like other human bodies with respect to those properties
which normally determine buoyancy, but which, inexplicably, does not
sink in this particular case. We do not, of course, have any evidence of
this sort for this particular miracle, and some would claim that there are
in fact no examples of such an event. It is easy, however, to imagine such
a case, and I will now attempt to illustrate this fact by means of an
extended discussion of the Shroud of Turin.
The Shroud of Turin is a sizable piece of linen cloth which bears the
image of a recently crucified man. It is known to have been in existence
since at least 1354 A.D. and is believed by some to be the actual burial
shroud of Jesus of Nazareth. Because Jesus died more than nineteen
centuries ago, public interest in the Shroud waned significantly when it
was announced that carbon-14 dating tests conducted by three supposedly reliable laboratories had indicated that the Shroud was only a little
more than six centuries old. Prior to the carbon dating tests, however,
scientists had subjected the Shroud to numerous non-destructive tests
and measurements in an effort to determine both the nature and the origin of the image which it bears. For most of these scientists, and for others who understand the implications of their work, the results of the carbon dating tests simply deepen the mystery of the image on the Shroud.
Marvin Mueller is a research physicist at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. He is familiar with many of the visual characteristics of the
image on the Shroud, but unfamiliar with the results of many of the scientific tests performed on it. Even before the carbon dating tests were
done, Mueller was convinced that the Shroud was a medieval work of
art. In a published paper, he says the following:
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"There are only three classes of possibilities for the image formation: by human artifice, through natural processes transferring the image to the linen from a real crucified corpse, or by
supernatural means."6
As a scientist, he immediately rejects the possibility that the image was
produced by supernatural means, because he believes that if we take
this possibility seriously, "all scientific discussion and all rational discourse must perforce cease".7 He then goes on to say that, based on the
visible characteristics of the image itself, "natural processes ... can be
ruled out definitively [his italics]. .. ", presumably on theoretical grounds
of an extremely general kind. s Tn other words, he argues for the first leg
of his trichotomy, i.e., for the claim that the Shroud is a work of art, primarily by rejecting the other two. The problem is that the STURP scientists·, who have worked most closely with the Shroud, are almost unanimous in rejecting any possibility of human artifice, simply because the
best interpretations of the substantial data which they have collected
count strongly against this possibility.
Let us now suppose that the trichotomy suggested by Mueller is legitimate, as it certainly seems to be. Let us further suppose that Mueller can
justify, on scientific grounds, his rejection of the possibility that the
image on the Shroud was produced naturally without human artifice.
Finally, let us suppose that the STURP scientists can justify, again on scientific grounds, their rejection of the possibility that the image was produced by human artifice. In other words, let us suppose that we have
strong scientific grounds for rejecting both the possibility that the image
is the result of human artifice and the possibility that it is the result of
natural processes not involving human artifice. Would we then be justified in regarding the Shroud image as "scientifically inexplicable", and
would we then have strong scientific grounds for accepting the third leg
of Mueller's trichotomy and believing that the image was produced by
supernatural means?
Let us begin by examining Mueller's trichotomy more carefully.
Although Mueller talks as if he is referring simply to different sorts of
processes (of image formation), it is clear from the context that he is
thinking primarily of explanations. But this presupposes that there are
objective facts here which need to be explained. Is this really true?
With regard to the image on the Shroud, it is clear that it is not a purely subjective phenomenon like the visions of Mary and Jesus often
reported by believers. Although faint, it is nonetheless visible to the
naked eye for normally sighted human beings and can be photographed
using any standard (and many non-standard) photographic techniques.
It is, in short, a completely objective feature of the cloth. Moreover,
although it is logically possible that the image is just an "accidental" feature of the cloth in the same way that outcroppings of rock sometimes
look like human faces in profile, this possibility does not deserve serious
consideration in the case of the Shroud. The image, when examined
closely, is simply too anatomically accurate and too detailed to be
"explained away" in this manner. It would thus appear that the exis-

40

Faith and Philosophy

tence of the image on the Shroud of Turin is an objective fact which, like
any other physical phenomenon which cannot be regarded as due simply to chance, must have an explanation.
We must now ask whether Mueller's trichotomy exhausts all possibilities of explanation. Given the common understanding of the term
"supernatural", it is clear that all possible explanations must be either
supernatural or naturalistic.lO Ignoring the possibility of a supernatural
explanation for the moment, it would seem that any naturalistic explanation must explain the nature and origin of the image completely in
terms of such things as the substance(s) of which it is now composed
and the various purely physical events involving the Shroud which have
occurred throughout its natural history. Assuming, as we surely must,
that the cloth itself antedates the image, there are only two possibilities
concerning the composition of the image itself. One possibility is that it
consists of a colored substance which has adhered to the cloth in just
those places necessary to account for the image which we see. The other
possibility is that some physical process has transformed certain fibers
of the cloth itself in such a way as to discolor them, thus producing the
image. To explain the image is thus, in the former case, to explain how
the colored substance got onto the Shroud, and in the latter case, to
explain how the fibers were transformed. If a human artist initiated
either of these processes in order to produce the image, the Shroud is a
work of art, and otherwise not. But since we are justified in assuming
that the image is an objective and non-accidental feature of the Shroud,
the only conceivable hypothesis concerning image-formation in the
absence of human artifice would surely be one involving interaction
between the Shroud and a human body. Thus all naturalistic explanations are either explanations in terms of human artifice or explanations
involving such interaction, and Mueller's trichotomy is established.
Initially, it seems overwhelmingly probable that the Shroud is a work
of art. After all, there is a clear sense in which the image on the Shroud is
a two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional entity, and there are
extraordinarily few examples of such things which are not due to artistic
endeavor of some sort.ll Jesus has probably been artistically depicted
more often and in a greater variety of ways than any other figure in
Western civilization, and the fact that various bodily features, such as
wounds, correspond to the events described in the Biblical narrative can
readily be explained in terms of the intentions of an informed artist.
Besides, no other naturalistic explanation for something like the image
springs readily to mind.
This helps to explain why most people, like Mueller, are so quick to
assume that the Shroud is a work of art. It also explains why the STURP
team began by attempting to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis,
rather than the naturalistic hypothesis rejected by Mueller. In particular,
they initially assumed that the image on the Shroud was a painting and
attempted, by means of various tests and measurements, to determine
how it was painted and with what. As previously mentioned, this
hypothesis initially seemed by far the most probable, but the epistemic
probability of a given hypothesis being true depends on what else we

MIRACLES AND THE SHROUD OF TURIN

41

know or have good reason to believe. As it turns out in the case of the
Shroud, most of the available scientific data concerning the image on the
Shroud of Turin tend to disconfirm the hypothesis that it is a work of
art, and nearly all of the STURP scientists have essentially ruled out this
hypothesis. They do not claim to have proven that the Shroud is not a
work of art. Their claim is rather that this hypothesis has been shown to
be highly improbable."
How can an hypothesis which is prima facie the most probable become
highly improbable? It would be beyond the scope of this paper to
attempt to cover all of the details of the scientific investigation which
leads to this conclusion, but some of the more accessible details can be
readily given. In the first place, the clearly visible details of the image
itself raise suspicions as to why an artist would have created it with the
features that it has. It consists, for example, of both a dorsal and a ventral image arranged longwise on the cloth and placed head to head, a
most peculiar artistic rendering of a human figure. In the second place,
the image has all the shading and contrast of a "negative" image, as if
the Shroud were a photographic negative waiting to be developed, and
we know that the image was in existence many centuries before the
invention of photography. Why would a medieval or classical artist create a "photographically negative" image?
The results of the scientific tests, however, are by far the most telling
evidence against the hypothesis that the Shroud is a work of art. Various
tests, for example, indicate the presence of blood, probably human, on
the Shroud. More precisely, although there is no single scientific test
which is definitive for the presence of blood, what appears to be blood on
the Shroud gives a positive reading on twelve different standard tests for
blood. This implies that the substance on the Shroud which appears to be
blood is either blood or a mixture of twelve other substances, each of
which gives a positive reading for one of the twelve different tests. 13 The
likelihood that these twelve substances would be mixed together deliberately by an artist or occur together naturally in some sort of artistic medium is vanishingly small, so if what appear to be blood stains on the
Shroud were put there by an artist, the artist must have used real blood.
Moreover, tests have shown that some of the blood found on the Shroud
is pre-mortem blood, and some, especially that found on the area of the
cloth corresponding to the side wound on the image (supposedly from
the spear wound inflicted by one of the executioners), is post-mortem
blood. 14 In addition, x-ray fluoroscopy indicates the presence of serum
albumin on the Shroud in those areas of the image where one would
expect to find it if the ostensible blood stains on the Shroud were in fact
due to wounds on a human body.15 If the Shroud is simply a work of art,
the artist must have applied not only both pre-mortem and post-mortem
blood, but also serum albumin in the appropriate places on the Shroud.
The application of serum albumin by an artist would be especially
remarkable, in view of the fact that it is a colorless liquid which remains
invisible and leaves physical effects visible only under ultraviolet light.
Finally, it has been determined that the blood on the Shroud was there
before the image was. 16 If both the apparent bloodstains and the image on
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the Shroud were put there by an artist, he or she must have begun by
putting blood and serum on the Shroud in various locations with the idea
of subsequently creating the image - a very unlikely scenario.
With regard to the image itself, as opposed to the apparent bloodstains, there are even greater difficulties for the hypothesis that it was
created by an artist. Microscopic examination reveals that there are no
brushstrokes, and no capillary action within the fibrils of the cloth
(which would necessarily have occurred if any liquid medium had been
used to create the image). Moreover, no pigment or other substance of
an appropriate kind and of sufficient amount to account for the image
was detected. This implies not only that the image is not a painting or
drawing of any kind, but also that it is not a rubbing, since this would
also require that some sort of colored particles adhere to the cloth. The
scientific investigation of the image shows that it is extraordinarily
superficial and consists of nothing but submicroscopic oxidized cellulose fibrils. In other words, the image was produced when some physical process slightly oxidized certain fibrils. The problem is that there is
no known physical process sufficiently subject to human control to
enable an artist to create such an image. The application of a liquid oxidizing agent would show the effects of capillary action, even more than
most liquid artistic media, and the use of a solid would have left some
residue and could not have been controlled well enough to produce
such a precise image. Finally, although various forms of radiant energy
are capable of oxidizing cloth, none of them can be controlled well
enough by human beings to produce a precise image like that on the
ShroudY This seems to exhaust the possibilities of artistic creation, but
there is still at least one more bit of scientific data indicating that the
image cannot be a work of art.
The most intriguing scientific data pertaining to the image on the
Shroud is that obtained by means of the VP-8 image analyzer. The VP-8
was developed by NASA to obtain "photographs" of celestial objects in
outer space. Unlike ordinary cameras, which rely on the diffused light
available within the earth's atmosphere to create an albedo image, the
VP-8 must rely entirely on light which emanates or is reflected directly
in straight lines from the object being photographed. Since the intensity
of light decreases as it travels through space, the VP-8 is programmed to
create realistic images of objects by treating their distances from the lens
of the VP-8 as a function of the intensity of the light reaching it from
those objects. In other words, if the intensity of the light reaching the
VP-8 from object A is less than that reaching it from object B, the VP-8
will create a picture which makes it look like object A is further away
from the camera than object B. The same principle applies to a single
three-dimensional object in that the part of that object that seems the farthest away in the picture created by the VP-8 will be that part from
which light of the lowest intensity is detected by the VP-8.
The VP-8 is fairly effective at producing realistic images of threedimensional objects in outer space, but because of the effects of diffusion, it produces remarkably distorted images when its lenses are
trained on ordinary two-dimensional representations of three-dim en-
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sionalobjects. In other words, a photograph of a realistic painting taken
by the VP-8 will not normally look realistic, nor will VP-8 photographs
of ordinary photographs. Photographs taken by the VP-8 of the image
on the Shroud, however, while they lack the resolution of ordinary photographs, do look realistic, at least in the sense that there is no spatial
distortion of the sort to be expected. This may not seem important to a
typical layperson, but to the physicists investigating the Shroud, it was
an important fact which needed to be explained. The most intriguing
fact is that the VP-8 takes into account differences in light intensity that
are far too small to be detected by human beings with the naked eye.
Artists who were commissioned to attempt to duplicate the physical
appearance of the image on the Shroud were unable to produce images
which did not produce distortion when photographed by the VP-8 even
though these images were, to the naked eye, almost indistinguishable
from the Shroud imageY Given the range and accuracy of the VP-S in
detecting different light intensities, the likelihood that a human artist
would accidentally create an image which does not produce distortion is
extremely small.
These considerations and many others like them have convinced
nearly all of the STURP scientists that the image on the Shroud cannot
be a work of art. As previously mentioned, they do not claim to have
proven that it is not a work of art, but scientists seldom if ever claim to
have proven anything absolutely. What they do say in this case is that it
is highly improbable that the Shroud is a work of art, which is to say that
they regard the hypothesis that it is not as highly confirmed.
The STURP scientists, of course, as scientists, are still committed to
the view that there must be a naturalistic explanation for the image, so
they have turned to the other naturalistic leg of Mueller's trichotomy
and are attempting to explain the image in terms of some sort of physical interaction between the cloth and the body of a recently crucified
man. This sort of explanation, however, is precisely the sort that Mueller
claims can be "ruled out definitively".19 The problem is that there are
strong theoretical considerations which seem to count against any
image-formation hypothesis consistent with both the known facts and
with currently accepted scientific theory. Explanations in terms of funereal oils and bodily secretions can be ruled out due to the previously
mentioned lack of capillarity displayed by the image, and lack of
residues rules out powdered oxidizing agents. The clarity of the image
rules out oxidizing vapors as a source of the image. Given the results of
the VP-S investigation, the best naturalistic hypothesis is that the image
was created by some form of radiation emanating from a human body,
but there is no explanation of how this radiation could have been produced, nor is there any known form of radiation which would have all
the requisite image-producing characteristics. One of the STURP scientists sums up the status of the scientific attempt to explain the image in
the following way:
"Briefly stated, we seem to know what the image is chemically,
but how it got there remains a mystery. The dilemma is not one
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of choosing from among a variety of likely transfer mechanisms,
but rather that no technologically credible process has been postulated that satisfies all the characteristics of the existing
image."2o

It might be appropriate at this point to reconsider the results of the
carbon dating tests. If these tests had shown conclusively that the
Shroud carne into existence only six or seven centuries ago, then we certainly would have been justified in concluding that it could not have
been the burial shroud of Jesus. This would also have lent significant
support to the skeptical view that the Shroud was, after all, nothing but
a medif''lal work of art. There are several problems with this view. In the
first place, the carbon-14 dating results are by no means conclusive. The
methods used are very controversial in archaeological circles, especially
when applied to cloth, since the method has often produced results
which are many centuries off when applied to samples of known age. In
addition, there are special problems in this particular case. The sample
used was apparently taken from a narrow strip along one side of the
cloth which might well have been added in the fourteenth century to
center the image for its first public display. Extreme heat from a fire
which almost destroyed the Shroud in 1532 could have resulted in ion
exchange which would have invalidated the results of the carbon dating
tests, as would various forms of radiation, which is significant if the
image was produced by a form of radiation. Finally, it has recently been
reported that the laboratories which conducted the tests may have failed
to cleanse the Shroud fragments of invisible, submicroscopic fungi, the
presence of which would also invalidate the results of a carbon-dating
test. More importantly for our present purposes, however, the results of
the carbon-dating tests, even if completely accurate, do nothing to explain
how the image was formed! If the Shroud itself carne into existence in
the fourteenth century, then the image was produced no earlier than
that, but how? Every bit of data which indicates that the Shroud is not a
work of art is completely unaffected by the carbon-14 data, and the
hypothesis that the image was produced by contact with a crucified
body becomes less likely than it would otherwise be, since it is less likely
that anyone was crucified in the fourteenth century. We still have no
naturalistic explanation of how the image was formed, and the "contact"
hypotheses currently favored by the STURP scientists are now even less
plausible than they would otherwise be. This explains why the results of
the carbon dating tests, far from resolving anything, actually make the
situation more confusing than ever to knowledgeable sindonologists.
Let us now summarize our discussion so far. It would seem that if we
assume that the image on the Shroud of Turin is neither subjective nor
an accidental phenomenon, then the only naturalistic explanations of its
nature and existence are that it is a work of art or that it is the natural
effect of a natural interaction between the cloth and a human body.
There is a strong body of scientific evidence which counts against the
hypothesis that it is a work of art, and there are strong theoretical considerations which count against its being the result of a natural interac-
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tion. No one has claimed that either of these hypotheses has been conclusively disproven, but it could be argued that they have both been scientifically disconfirmed to such an extent that they have become unreasonable to believe. But what then is reasonable to believe about the
image? If it really is "scientifically inexplicable", are we to believe simply that it has no explanation, or should we believe that the correct
explanation, if we are willing to call it an "explanation", is that a supernatural event has occurred? Within the context of the theistic framework sketched earlier in this paper, why not simply conclude that God
changed the inherent properties of some of the theons composing the
Shroud in order to produce the image? If we decide to reject the results
of the carbon dating tests, why not simply conclude that the image was
produced when God changed the causal powers of the theons composing the body of Jesus at the moment of the Resurrection?
As of this writing, it is tempting to regard the image on the Shroud of
Turin as scientifically inexplicable in the stronger of the two senses
described above. In the first place, far from not having enough data, we
seem to have enough to know exactly what the image consists in, even
though we have no idea what produced it. In the second place, far from
having too many possible explanations to choose from, we currently
have none consistent both with what we know about the image and with
currently accepted scientific theory.21 Finally, although we have not
mentioned this previously, the Shroud image appears to be unique. If
the Shroud is a burial garment, it is the only one among thousands of
extant specimens which bears a recognizable image (although there are
many with decomposition stains and bloodstains on them), and if it is a
work of art, it is the only one which has many of the physical features
previously described. It thus appears that it might satisfy all of the conditions mentioned for something's being scientifically inexplicable in the
strong sense mentioned above.
The fact that no satisfactory scientific explanation of the Shroud
image has been given does not imply that none can be, and no scientists,
including the members of STURP, have concluded that the Shroud
image is scientifically inexplicable. For one thing, despite everything
that has been said above, it is nevertheless true that the facts about the
Shroud of Turin are not all in, and never will be. Besides, it is always
possible that some of the data referred to earlier will prove to be faulty,
or that someone will discover a fairly simple naturalistic hypothesis that
has been overlooked, in which case the Shroud of Turin may lose its air
of mystery. It is also possible, however, that the data will not prove to
be faulty, and that the origin of the image will never be naturalistically
explained. In any case, it would appear, as of this writing at least, that
science has given us good reason to believe that the image on the Shroud
of Turin is scientifically inexplicable in a fairly strong sense of the term.
A fairly intensive scientific investigation has given us no good scientific
reason to believe that the image is a work of art, and many scientific reasons to believe that it is not. Moreover, despite extensive knowledge of
the physical nature of this particular image and of the various processes
which are capable of producing images on cloth, this same scientific
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investigation has produced no credible hypothesis concerning the formation of the image. Moreover, scientists have more or less ruled out entire
classes of potential explanations, and it is difficult to see how more data
would help. In recent years, each new batch of data has simply deepened the mystery. As the scientific grounds for rejecting both of the first
two legs of Mueller's trichotomy continue to accumulate, must there not
be some point at which it is simply unreasonable to believe that the
image on the Shroud has a completely naturalistic explanation? And
would it not then become reasonable to infer that it must have a supernatural explanation?
The answer to this question at present is at best a "qualified maybe".
To see why, we must re-examine the argument derived from Mueller's
trichotomy. Simply put, the argument has the following logical form:
(1) The Shroud image is either a work of art, a result of a natural

interaction between a human body and the cloth, or a supernatural phenomenon.
(2) The Shroud image is not a work of art.
(3) The Shroud image is not a result of a natural interaction between
a human body and the cloth.
Therefore,
(4) The Shroud image is a supernatural phenomenon.
This is a valid form of argument, and we have already established that
(1) is true. If we could establish the truth of (2) and (3) to the same
degree of credibility as (1), we could then be confident of the truth of (4).
Assuming that supernatural phenomena are almost always scientifically
inexplicable, we could then regard the Shroud image as scientifically
inexplicable in an "absolute" sense of the term. As it turns out, of course,
we never can establish the truth of (2) and (3) to the same degree of credibility as (1), but it would at least appear that (2) and (3) might be rendered increasingly probable by further scientific research, in which case
the probability of (4) would presumably be increased as well. Thus it
would seem that science itself might indeed present us with good
grounds for believing that a scientifically inexplicable event has
occurred. To .put it another way, the scientific evidence which we have
concerning the image on the Shroud of Turin is of considerable weight,
and gives us much more reason to believe that the image is scientifically
inexplicable than we would otherwise have. Moreover, it might even
turn out that when all is said and done, the most reasonable explanation,
all things considered, for the image on the Shroud of Turin is that a
miraculous event has occurred, or perhaps even that the image was produced by the resurrection of Jesus from the dead.
Even if, however, science can provide us with good grounds for
believing that a scientifically inexplicable event has occurred, it does not
follow that science can prove that this has happened, nor does it follow
that science in itself can show that such an event must be miraculous. In
the first place, just as there can be violations of scientific law which are
not miraculous, there can be scientifically inexplicable events which are
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not miraculous. Although we might have good grounds for regarding a
scientifically inexplicable spontaneous remission of an ordinarily fatal
disease as miraculous, we would presumably not so regard a scientifically inexplicable recurrence (or first occurrence) of such a disease. The
point here is that even in those cases where an event's being scientifically
inexplicable is an important reason for its being regarded as miraculous,
it is never a sufficient condition for so regarding it. The concept of a miracle must obviously be defined at least partly in terms of divine agency
and purpose, but the nature of God precludes a direct empirical discovery of either of these things. Thus, even in those cases where a theistic
explanation seems to be the most reasonable, science itself cannot provide direct evidence of divine involvement, and any inferences to such
involvement, even if justified in some sense, is not scientifically justified. 22
More importantly, all claims concerning scientific inexplicability are
necessarily defeasible, so that what is scientifically inexplicable today
might not be scientifically inexplicable tomorrow. This is not to say that
we are never justified in believing that something is scientifically inexplicable, nor is it to say that nothing can be permanently or absolutely scientifically inexplicable. It is simply to say that even in those cases in which the
most reasonable thing to say is that something is scientifically inexplicable, it is nevertheless possible that this might not always be the case.
Everything science tells us is provisional. This is inherent in the nature of
science. With regard to the Shroud of Turin, for example, no matter how
probable (2) and (3) become relative to available evidence and then-current scientific theory, it will always be at least possible that either (2) or (3)
is false, so that (4) can never be conclusively established by means of this
argument. We will always be free to withhold judgment while we continue to attempt to discredit either (2) or (3), and this is precisely what the
STURP scientists have done and will probably continue to do.
Any attempt to enlist science as the handmaiden of theology in this
case thus runs into two difficulties. In the first place, it must acknowledge that science can at best provide indirect, circumstantial support for
the claim that a miracle has occurred. Even if science could somehow
conclusively demonstrate the truth of both (2) and (3), non-scientific considerations would also have to be introduced to justify the conclusion
that a miracle had occurred. In the second place, it must acknowledge
that, to the extent that science can at best show (2) and (3) to be highly
probable, any conclusion based on them will also be only probable, and
these probabilities can change dramatically with the accumulation of
new data and the evolution of scientific theory. Finally, it would seem
that the conclusions reached here in the case of the Shroud of Turin can
easily be generalized. Science deals only with the physical world; divinity is inaccessible to it. It can therefore neither confirm nor disconfirm
claims involving the existence, nature, or agency of God. Moreover, even
in those cases where physical evidence (or the lack thereof) seems to
suggest divine agency or presence, this evidence, to the extent that it is
provided by science, must be probabilistic at best.
David Hume, in his famous chapter on miracles, says the following:
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... we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can
have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion. I beg the limitations here
made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be
proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I
own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of
proof from human testimony; ... 23

It is not entirely clear what Hume means by this, nor are his motives for
saying it as clear as we might hope. What is clear is that he would countenance a belief that "a violation of the usual course of nature" had
occurred more readily if it were not used as a "foundation" for religious
belief. In other words, we may need better reasons to base a religion on
presumed empirical facts than we need simply to believe those facts in
themselves. Hume may have been somewhat confused and misguided
concerning both the nature and the possibility of miracles, but, ironically
enough, he may have been on the right track in this instance at leasU4
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or entities which are not part of the physical universe but which nevertheless have physical effects within the physical universe. An explanation in
terms of the activities of "extraterrestrials", i.e., physical beings from some
distant part of the physical universe, would thus not be considered supernatural, whereas an explanation in terms of the activities of such beings as
God or angels (fallen or otherwise) would be.
11. The only example that comes readily to mind is the "permanent
shadows" of physical objects which appeared on walls as a result of the
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World
War II. Even in this case, the "shadows" were the result of deliberate human
action, but at least they were not one of the intended results.
12. I once asked one of the STURP physicists what he would conclude if
the carbon dating (which had not yet been done at that time) indicated a
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fourteenth century. I took this to be a measure of his confidence that the
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